McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505 - Workers Compensation Recovery for Psychological Injuries

Plaintiff was a teller at a bank which was robbed twice in eight months.  She did not suffer a bodily injury as a result of either robbery.  She was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder after the second robbery and made a Workers Compensation claim.  Her claim was denied as R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) excludes purely psychological injuries from recovery under Workers Compensation.  Plaintiff contended the statute was unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court upheld the statute and ruled the state had a valid and legitimate interest in precluding purely psychological injuries from recovery.

Wood v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 156 Ohio App. 3d 725, 2004-Ohio-1765 - Psychological Injuries.

A State Trooper made a worker’s compensation claim contending as a result of his work experiences he contracted post-traumatic stress disorder. He did not suffer a contemporaneous bodily injury, and his only injury was psychological in nature. The court of appeals held his worker’s compensation claim was properly denied as there is no right to a worker’s compensation claim for a solely psychological injury.

Martin v. Pechiney Plastic Packaging, 2004-Ohio-147 - Sexual Harassment Claims.

Plaintiff was verbally and physically sexually harassed by her employer. She did not sustain any bodily injury, but made a worker’s compensation claim contending she had post-traumatic stress disorder. The court of appeals upheld the denial of her worker’s compensation claim on the basis the only harm she suffered was psychological and not physical.

Modzelewski v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 102 Ohio St. 3d 192, 2004-Ohio-2365 - Worker’s Compensation/Subrogation

A self-insured employer tried to assert a right of subrogation for worker’s compensation payments it made on behalf of its employee. The employer argued the Supreme Court’s decision in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Company, 92 Ohio St. 3d 115, 2001-Ohio-109, only found unconstitutional the 1995 version of R.C. 4123.931, and that the supposed effect of Holeton was that the earlier version of the subrogation statute, R.C. 4123.931 (effective in 1993) still gave employers a right of subrogation. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held all prior versions of Ohio’s worker’s compensation subrogation statute are unconstitutional. This decision does not affect the validity of the new statute which was enacted in 2003.

Hoover v. Trans Continental Insurance Company, 2004-Ohio-72 - Effect of Prior Worker’s Compensation Ruling

Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident, and in addition to claiming musculo-skeletal injuries and also alleged a “cognitive/amnestic disorder.” Plaintiff filed two separate lawsuits: one relative to his worker’s compensation claim, and the other tort action against the at fault drivers. The worker’s compensation case was tried first, and the jury concluded only the musculo-skeletal injuries were causally related to the accident. In the tort action, the defendants then argued plaintiff was collaterally estopped from continuing to assert that the cognitive/amnestic disorder was related to the auto accident, given the theories in the earlier ruling. The court of appeals agreed and held that plaintiff could not relitigate the issue of causation.

DiPietro v. Lighthouse Ministries, 159 Ohio App. 3d 766, 2005-Ohio-639 - Vicarious Liability for Sexual Misconduct

Plaintiff sued her church for negligence, following a consensual relationship with her pastor.  The relationship began after the pastor counseled her on several occasions for her marital problems.  Plaintiff alleged the church was negligent in its hiring and retention of the pastor.  Plaintiff also alleged the church was vicariously liable for his conduct. 

The appellate court held there was no vicarious liability as the conduct of the pastor was clearly outside of the course and scope of his employment and had no religious motivation.  The court specifically held the pastor’s conduct had no relation to his work duties nor did it further the church’s interests in any respect.  Additionally plaintiff presented no evidence that the church knew or should have known of any prior propensity the pastor had for engaging in such activity. 

Jankovsky v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 2005-Ohio-1432 - Course and Scope of Employment

The appellate court held an employer is not ordinarily liable for the negligence of their employee while driving to and from work, unless doing so bestows some sort of special benefit to the employer. 

Conttrill v. Wayne Mutual Insurance Company, 2005-Ohio-4937 - Course and Scope of Employment

Plaintiff was injured in an accident in a company owned parking lot, when struck by a car driven by a fellow employee.  The appellate court held the fellow employee was immune under the fellow servant doctrine.  It was further held plaintiff could not make an uninsured motorist claim. 

Tressler v. Specialty Transportation Services, Inc., 2005-Ohio-4866 - Course and Scope of Employment

Plaintiff was a van driver for a company responsible for transporting children to school.  She picked up her van in the morning at the company’s garage and then drove back home to prepare for her route.  Later in the day, while at home, she was injured while cleaning snow from the van.  It was determined she was acting within the course and scope of her employment, and her injury was therefore compensable through Workers’ Compensation. 

Medina v. Harold J. Becker Company, Inc., 2005-Ohio-5438  - Loaned Servant Doctrine

An unskilled labor agency provided plaintiff to a roofing contractor for a job project.  Plaintiff was injured on the job and brought a workplace intentional tort suit.  An issue arose as to whether plaintiff was an employee of the roofing contractor and/or the labor agency.  The appellate court determined that under the loaned servant doctrine plaintiff was an employee only of the roofing contractor and not the labor agency.  Accordingly the labor agency had no liability.  The court based this ruling on the fact that while on the job plaintiff was under the exclusive direction and control of the roofing contractor.