Sixty-Eight Liquors, Inc. v. Colvin, Ky., 118 S.W.3d 171 (2003)—Dram Shop Liability
A 16 year old and four others were killed in a vehicle accident which occurred after the minor had purchased beer from Sixty-Eight Liquors. The estate of the minor and the surviving parents brought a wrongful death action against the liquor store and others. The trial court dismissed the estate’s claim because it found the minors’ consumption of alcohol constituted the proximate cause of the accident under KRS 413.241. The estate appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the estate’s claim against Sixty-Eight Liquors. It also held Sixty-Eight Liquors would be entitled to indemnity from the minor’s estate for any liability it might have to third parties. The store appealed. The Supreme Court considered whether the estate had any valid claims against the liquor store and whether the liquor store had a right of indemnity from the minor’s estate for claims made by the minor’s estate or by injured third persons against the liquor store. The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected the liquor store’s argument that a dram shop is not liable to an intoxicated person or a minor under Kentucky law. It found by statute, liability is imputed to a dram shop for the sale or service of alcohol to a minor. This is because the statutory assignment of proximate cause to the consumer of alcohol requires the purchaser to be of legal age for a lawful purchase. Thus, a legal sale is required for a dram shop to be shielded from liability pursuant to KRS 413.241. Regarding the indemnity, the Supreme Court held KRS 413.141(3) granted a licensed establishment a right of indemnity, even where it has sold liquor to a minor for claims made by injured third persons. However, it found the liquor store had no indemnity claim against the minor’s estate for liability due to the minor’s own injuries and death.
Regenstreif v. Phelps, Ky., 142 S.W.3d 1 (2004) – Comparative Negligence/Sudden Emergency Rule
Phelps’ vehicle crossed the center line and struck the Regenstrief’s vehicle head-on. At the ensuing civil trial, evidence indicated black ice may have caused the accident. The trial court’s instructions to the jury included an instruction on the “sudden emergency rule.” The jury found Phelps did not violate her duty of care and returned a verdict in her favor. At trial, Phelps testified she lost control of her vehicle because of a patch of ice on the road at a curve. She did not observe the ice until after she exited the vehicle at the accident scene. Another witness testified the roads in the subdivision were slick that morning and the investigating officer testified the ice was present on the roads and her cruiser skidded on the ice when she arrived at the accident site.
The Supreme Court was later called upon to decide whether the trial court properly included the sudden emergency instruction in its charge to the jury. The Supreme Court held the trial court properly instructed the jury concerning the sudden emergency rule and that Kentucky still recognizes the sudden emergency rule even after adopting comparative negligence. The Court noted the sudden emergency rule does not excuse fault, it defines the conduct to be expected of a reasonably prudent person in an emergency situation.
Previs v. Dailey, Ky., 180 S.W. 3d 435 (2005) – Bicyclists
While riding her bicycle on the right hand side of the road, Previs was injured by a truck driven by Dailey as she crested the hill. Testimony at trial suggested Previs was not an experienced cyclist, she may have accelerated while Dailey’s vehicle was passing her and she did not see Dailey. Testimony also suggested Dailey moved to the left hand lane as he passed Previs and did not see her as he returned his vehicle to the right hand lane. The trial court denied the parties’ motions for directed verdict. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dailey. The Supreme Court reversed, holding Dailey was negligent as a matter of law. The Court held the jury’s verdict absolving Dailey of liability was “so flagrantly and palpably against the weight of the evidence as to indicate that it was reached as a result of passion or prejudice.” The Court held the trial court should have granted Previs a directed verdict on the issue of Dailey’s negligence. However, a jury is still entitled to consider Previs’ duties in operating her bicycle, and apportion fault should it find Previs was negligent, as well.
Bentley v. Bentley, Ky., 172 S.W. 3d 375 (2005) – Intra-Family Immunity
The plaintiff, Mr. Bentley, was a passenger in a car insured by his wife which was being driven by his daughter. The car ran off the road and Mr. Bentley was injured. He sued his daughter for negligence and also sued his insurer for bad faith refusal to settle his claim in violation of Kentucky’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA). The insurer refused to settle based upon existing case law which held a parent cannot maintain an action in tort against his or her unemancipated minor child for injuries arising out of the child’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court considered whether to overrule existing case law regarding intra family immunity and let the case go forward. The Court also had to decide whether the insurer’s refusal to settle the claim based upon that case law permitted a bad faith cause of action to go forward. The Supreme Court allowed Bentley’s case to go forward against his daughter, but upheld the dismissal of his bad faith claims against the insurance company. The court noted at least 6 jurisdictions have specifically held a parent can sue his or her unemancipated minor child for damages due to the child’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle and other jurisdictions have abolished parent-child immunity under certain circumstances. The court held with the exception of “common-place incidents in family life” (acts which are not likely to cause harm to the general public) a parent may be able to sue their minor child for negligence. Regarding the bad faith claim, the court held since the insurance company in this case denied the claim in reliance on existing case law which had not been overruled, there was a reasonable basis for denying the claim, and the trial court properly dismissed the bad faith claim.
Kentucky Kingdom Amusement Co. v. Belo Kentucky, Inc., dba WHAS-TV, Ky., 75 S.W. 3d 218 (2005) - Defamation
This case arises from a defamation action brought by a public figure against a news media defendant. In 1994, five passengers were injured when two cars collided during the operation of Kentucky Kingdom’s indoor steel rollercoaster known as the “Starchaser.” Kentucky Kingdom alleged three statements made during WHAS TV broadcasts were libelous. The alleged libelous statements included the following:
“State inspectors also think the ride is too dangerous.”
“The rollercoaster ride that malfunctioned earlier this week.”
“Kentucky Kingdom removed a key component of the ride.”
At trial, Kentucky Kingdom introduced evidence which in its opinion showed all three statements were false and the defendant made the statements knowing they were false or with reckless disregard as to whether they were false. The trial judge instructed the jury it could find liability for the specific statements and/or the telecasts in which statements were made “taken as a whole.” The jury found each of the statements and each series of telecasts taken as a whole were defamatory. Damages were not broken down to indicate separate damages for the specific statements or telecasts. The jury awarded Kentucky Kingdom $475,000.00 for loss of profits; $1 million for damages to reputation; and $2.5 million in punitive damages. The trial judge granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding reputation damages determining they were speculative. Defendant appealed and Kentucky Kingdom cross-appealed to regain its $1 million for injury to reputation.
The Supreme Court held the evidence presented by Kentucky Kingdom sufficiently demonstrated there was clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. It held a jury in this type of action must consider the broadcasts in their entirety when determining whether the statements and inferences within it are false and defamatory. A defamatory publication must be considered as a whole because the cumulative effect of the facts may support the finding by the jury of actual malice. The court stated evidence of malice included a failure to correct inaccuracies; continuing commitment to running and re-running the same story line; a significant failure to investigation or verify credibility; and the general make up and presentation of the story exhibited hostility. The Supreme Court agreed the jury verdict regarding loss of reputation was speculative and therefore the judgment notwithstanding the verdict on that issue was upheld.
