Patterson v. Blair, dba Courtesy Auto Plex, Ky., 172 S.W. 3d 361 (2005) - Vicarious Liability
Patterson sued Blair and Courtesy under several tort theories after Blair drew a pistol and fired two shots in the front and rear tires of the vehicle driven by Patterson. This incident arose after a disagreement between Patterson and Blair regarding the sale and transfer of ownership of the vehicle. He claimed Courtesy was vicariously liable for the tortuous acts of its employee, Blair. A jury awarded Patterson damages of $42,642.18 and found Courtesy was vicariously liable for Blair’s conduct. After a lengthy discussion of vicarious liability under Kentucky law, the Supreme Court held “clearly, in confronting Patterson and shooting out the truck’s tires, Blair was acting to further the business interest of Courtesy. At the very least, his conduct was at least incidental to the conduct that was authorized by Courtesy…Blair was acting to protect his employer’s property.” The court stated there was no evidence Blair sought to serve any personal purpose by his actions. The court further held although the act was criminal, it was not so outrageous to indicate the motive was a personal one and therefore the jury’s finding that Blair acted within the scope of his employment imposing vicarious liability on Courtesy was supported by the evidence and Kentucky law.
Moore v. Environmental Construction Corp., Ky., 147 S.W.3d 13 (2004) – Worker’s Compensation/Intentional Acts
Environmental Construction Corp., (“Environmental”) won a bid on a contract for a sewer rehabilitation project. OSHA has regulations for taking precautions to prevent cave-ins when digging trenches. Environmental’s superintendent made one of its officers, Mr. Sargent, the “competent person” responsible for the project. While working on a trench which was deemed non-hazardous, a nine-foot long portion of the trench collapsed onto Mr. Sargent’s nephew, Mr. Moore, a member of the crew. He was suffocated and died almost instantly. OSHA issued four citations including failure to report an incident within eight hours, failure to provide an escape ladder, failure to have a competent person conduct daily inspections and for not taking adequate safety precautions.
Mr. Moore’s family filed suit alleging at trial Environmental’s failure to take precautions constituted a deliberate intention to kill their son, which would avoid the exclusivity provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Act. The Act provides “If injury or death results to an employee through the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee or his dependents may take under this chapter, or in lieu thereof, have a cause of action at law against the employer as if this chapter had not been passed…” Although the jury’s verdict found such intent, the trial judge determined the safety violations did not amount to a deliberate intent on the part of Environmental and entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Environmental.
The Supreme Court held it was proper for the trial court to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict under these circumstances. The Court stated, “It is the duty of the Court to set aside a jury verdict which imposes liability upon sympathetic considerations, where fault is not shown.” The Court held there was no indication Environmental’s failure was done with a deliberate intention to produce Mr. Moore’s death.
Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Ky., 151 S.W.3d 781 (2004) – Intentional Torts/Employee
Plaintiffs were fired for eating candy from packages returned to Wal-Mart for store credit. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Wal-Mart alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation and invasion of privacy. Plaintiffs alleged it was common for employees to eat the candy and alleged Wal-Mart engaged in a conspiracy to deny employees employment/unemployment benefits by using a videotape to confront employees concerning their activities in the break room where the candy was eaten. Plaintiffs alleged Wal-Mart had made publications to third parties, which would lead people to believe plaintiffs had stolen from the company. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs’ favor on each of their claims, which included $2,000,000.00 in compensatory damages, $1,000,000.00 for “injury to reputation,” $1,000,000.00 for “embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish,” and $3,000,000.00 in punitive damages. Ms. Stringer was awarded an additional $20,000.00 for lost wages. The Court of Appeals held the trial court erred by failing to direct a verdict in the company’s favor as to each of plaintiffs’ claims and reversed the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.
The Supreme Court granted discretionary review. The Supreme Court held the trial court erred in not directing a verdict in favor of Wal-Mart on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Supreme Court allowed the verdict against Wal-Mart as to liability for defamation to stand. The Supreme Court also determined there was insufficient proof to sustain plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim. Although the Supreme Court held sufficient evidence existed for plaintiffs’ defamation claim to proceed to trial, since the jury’s compensatory and punitive damage verdicts did not segregate the damages awards for each claim, the Supreme Court vacated the previous damage awards and remanded the case for the trial court to conduct a retrial solely to determine appropriate damages for the defamation claim.
Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Ky., 151 S.W. 3d 781 (2005) - Age Discrimination
Williams sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and two individual Wal-Mart management employees alleging wrongful termination based upon unlawful age discrimination. The jury awarded Williams damages of $539,237.00. Evidence presented at trial suggested Williams, a cashier, was forced to resign after she allegedly took two gallons of sodium free water without paying for them. After a 45 minute meeting with managers, and being unable to produce receipts for the water, she resigned, and after leaving the store she paid for the water.
The Supreme Court reviewed the requirements a plaintiff must meet to prevail in a discrimination claim. A prima facie case must be shown through direct evidence of discriminatory animus or otherwise through the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting approach. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by circumstantial evidence if he proves 1) she is a member of a protected class, 2) was discharged, 3) was qualified for the position and 4) was replaced by a person outside the protected class. Evidence showed the next 16 hires made by Wal-Mart after Williams’ separation were individuals at least 8 years younger than Williams and she made a prima facie case. However, the court further held Wal-Mart articulated a “legitimate non-discriminatory reason” for her termination, namely, that Williams violated its strict policy against employees taking merchandise without first paying for it.
Although the Court held Williams created a weak issue of fact regarding whether the employer’s reason for termination was untrue, there was “abundant and uncontraverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” The Supreme Court held there was not sufficient evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude Wal-Mart unlawfully discriminated against Williams because of her age. The court cited two uncontraverted facts to support this conclusion. First, Wal-Mart presented evidence two employees under the age of 40 were fired for substantially the same reasons (drinking an Icee and a soft drink which had not been paid for). Second, evidence showed the supervisor responsible for Williams’ termination did not know her age at the time he made the decision.
Hargis v. Baize, Ky., 168 S.W. 3d 36 (2005) - Safety Regulations
Hargis was killed when a large log rolled off a trailer while he worked as an independent contractor at the Baize Lumber Yard. Hargis’ widow as administratrix of his estate and on behalf of their two minor children brought this action against Baize alleging the fatal accident was caused by Baize’s failure to comply with Kentucky Administrative Regulation 803 KAR 2:317 §2 (now §3), Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Act (KOSHA). During discovery Baize admitted it was not his company’s policy to comply with certain KOSHA regulations at issue. Baize’s former safety officer testified in a discovery deposition an insurance representative visited the cite two weeks before Hargis was killed and recommended implementation the securing procedures required by the KOSHA regulations. Evidence indicated that the recommendation was rejected even though the operations manager had recently been injured in a similar accident. After discovery, the estate moved for partial summary judgment claiming violation of the KOSHA regulations was negligence per se and created a private cause of action for wrongful death. Thus, the jury should be instructed only on Hargis’ contributory fault, if any, and damages. Baize moved for summary judgment claiming the violation did not create a private cause of action and that his only duty to an independent contractor was to warn him of any hidden dangers on the premises. The trial court agreed with Baize and also construed a release signed by Hargis in 1998 to be a valid contract exculpating Baize from any liability for damages to Hargis caused by Baize’s negligence. The trial court overruled the motion for partial summary judgment and entered summary judgment in favor of Baize. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review and reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to vacate the summary judgment granted to Baize, grant partial summary judgment to Hargis on the issue of Baize’s liability and conduct further proceedings as necessary. The Supreme Court noted a party cannot contract away liability for damages caused by a party’s failure to comply with the duty imposed by a safety statute. The Supreme Court held since Hargis was an independent contractor, his death was not within the purview of the Workers Compensation Act. Thus, this civil action is not precluded; but Hargis’ alleged contributory fault, if any, would be a factor to consider in determining causation and whether any damages should be reduced on the basis of comparative fault.
